Buyer-seller watermarking protocols incorporate digital watermarking with cryptography, in order to protect digital copyrights and privacy rights for the seller and the buyer before, during, and after trading activities in e-commerce. In this paper, we present attacks on two recently proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocols, and prove that these protocols are not able to provide security for both the buyer and the seller simultaneously. Further, we point out that both protocols don't function properly when employing homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems. We also show that the buyer's anonymity and/or the transaction unlinkability is not achieved in these protocols. We propose an improved secure and anonymous buyer-seller protocol, which is secure and fair for both the seller and the buyer. In contrast to early work, our scheme is able to provide all the security properties that a secure buyer-seller watermarking protocol is expected to hold.
Introduction
The recent success of the Internet and the rapid development of information technology facilitate the proliferation of e-commerce, where all types of multimedia information can easily be stored, traded, replicated, and distributed in digital form without a loss of quality. As a main advantage over traditional commercial means, e-commerce brings convenience and efficiency for trading activities between sellers and buyers. However, it also enables illegal replications and distributions of digital products at a low cost. In this regard, there are many multimedia content providers still hesitating to sell and distribute their products over the Internet. Therefore, digital copyright protection is a main concern that needs to be addressed. On the other hand, how to protect the rights and provide security for both the seller and the buyer is another challenge for e-commerce.
In the realm of security, encryption and digital watermarking are recognized as promising techniques for copyright protection. Encryption is to prevent unauthorized access to a digital content. The limitation is that once the content is decrypted, it doesn't prevent illegal replications by an authorized user. Digital watermarking [6, 5, 11] , complementing encryption techniques, provides provable copyright ownership by imperceptibly embedding the seller's information in the distributed content. Similarly, digital fingerprinting is to trace and identify copyright violators by embedding the buyer's information in the distributed content. The literature of fingerprinting research can be categorized as fingerprinting for generic data, e.g. c-secure fingerprinting code by Boneh et al. [2] , fingerprinting for multimedia data [27, 26, 18] , and fingerprinting protocols, e.g. the ones based on secure two-party computations [24, 23] or based on coin-based constructions [21, 22, 3] . The shortcoming of these fingerprinting schemes lies in the inefficiency of the implementations [14] .
A buyer-seller watermarking protocol combines encryption, digital watermarking, and fingerprinting, with the intention to ensure rights protection and security for both the buyer and the seller in e-commerce. A buyer-seller watermarking protocol should provide the following security properties [13, 10] , as the strategic design principle: Traceability: A copyright violator should be able to be traced and identified. Non-framing: Nobody can accuse an honest buyer. Non-repudiation: A guilty buyer cannot deny his responsibility for a copyright violation caused by him. Dispute resolution: The copyright violator should be identified and adjudicated without him revealing his private information, e.g. private keys or secret watermark. Anonymity: A buyer's identity is undisclosed until he is judged to be guilty. Unlinkability: Nobody can determine whether the different watermarked contents are purchased by the same buyer.
The literature is rich of relevant buyer-seller watermarking protocols. Qiao and Nahrstedt [25] first pointed out the customer's rights problem in the watermarking protocols for piracy tracing. However, their scheme is symmetric and doesn't guarantee the buyer's security. The first known asymmetric buyer-seller watermarking protocol was introduced by Memon and Wong [19] by applying privacy homomorphic cryptosystems, and it was extended by Ju et al. [14] . Since the introduction of the concept, several alternative designs have been proposed [13, 10, 17, 28, 12] . Choi et al. [13] pointed out the conspiracy problem in [19, 14] , where a malicious seller can collude with an untrustworthy third party to fabricate piracy to frame an innocent buyer. Goi et al. [17] found the conspiracy problem couldn't be solved through commutative cryptosystems of [13] . Lei et al. [17] addressed the unbinding problem in [19, 14, 13, 10] and provided a mechanism to bind a specific transaction of a digital content to a specific buyer, such that a malicious seller cannot transplant the watermark embedded in a digital content to another higher-priced content. Zhang et al. [28] presented a scheme, derived from [17] , where no trusted third party (TTP) is required in the watermark generation phase and the conspiracy problem is solved. Unfortunately, we find the existence of dispute resolution problem: in [28] , in order to resolve disputes the buyer is required to cooperate and reveal his secret key or his secret watermark to the judge or to the CA, which is unrealistic in real-life applications. Ibrahim et al. [12] recently proposed a scheme claiming that all the above problems has been solved.
Our contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we analyze the security and present attacks on the protocols by Lei et al. [17] and Ibrahim et al. [12] , and prove that neither of them is able to provide security for the buyer and/or the seller as claimed. Further, both protocols require to employ deterministic cryptosystems. Unfortunately, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic [9] , and both protocols require a privacy homomorphism for watermark insertion in the encrypted domain. In this regard, we can prove that both protocols are not able to work properly as designed to be. Next, we point out that the buyer's anonymity and/or the transaction unlinkability is not provided by these two protocols. Second, we propose an anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol, which is secure and fair for both the seller and the buyer. Our protocol employs privacy homomorphic cryptosystems to protect the buyer's secret watermark, and group signature schemes to provide revocable anonymity of the buyer. The proposed protocol is an improvement of the early work [7, 28] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we analyze the security of the protocols by Lei et al. [17] . In Sec. 3, we analyze the security of the protocols by Ibrahim et al [12] . We present our proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocol in Sec. 4. We analyze the security of our protocol in Sec. 5. We conclude in Sec. 6.
2 Attacks on the protocol of Lei et al.
In Lei et al.'s protocol [17] , the players are the seller Alice A, the buyer Bob B, the certificate authority CA, the watermark certificate authority WCA, and the arbitrator J. The protocol comprises three phases, namely the registration protocol, the watermark generation and insertion protocol, and the identification and arbitration protocol.
Attack on the buyer's security
Collusion of the seller and the WCA. In the protocol, Alice generates her watermark V and embeds V to the original content X, X = X ⊕ V . The WCA generates Bob's watermark W , and sends Alice two encrypted values of W with Bob's encryption key pk B * and WCA's encryption key, respectively. Alice embeds the encrypted watermarked, E pkB * (X ) = E pkB * (X ) ⊕ E pkB * (W ). When malicious Alice colludes with the untrustworthy WCA, Alice sends E pkB * (W ) back to the WCA. WCA recovers W via decryption, and sends W to Alice. After Alice obtains W , she knows all the necessary information X, V, W to reproduce the watermarked content for Bob X .
Lei et al.'s assume that the WCA will not reveal Bob's information to Alice. However, the assumption is unrealistic. Because there is no technical enforcement for WCA not to reveal any private information to Alice, the conspiracy attack is effective. Once Alice gets Bob's watermark, any important features of the protocol would end up getting compromised. First, the piracy traceability won't be achieved, since both the buyer and the seller might be the traitor. Second, non-framing fails, even though the unbinding problem is solved in the protocol. Alice is able to frame an innocent Bob by reproducing and redistributing the watermarked content X . Third, non-repudiation fails, even though B doesn't know W and cannot remove W from X . A malicious Bob can deny his guilt by claiming that the pirated copy was created by Alice or a security breach in Alice's computing system. In fact, this attack weakens the security for both the buyer and the seller.
Attack on the seller's security
Collusion of the buyer and the WCA. Besides the conspiracy attack explained above, a malicious buyer and the untrustworthy WCA can also collude. In this case, the WCA informs Bob the actual value of W directly, so that it is possible for Bob to remove his watermark from the watermarked digital content. Therefore, non-repudiation won't hold, and the protocol fails to provide security for the seller.
Failure for probabilistic cryptosystems
In the arbitration and identification protocol, the WCA is required by the arbitrator J to decrypt E pk W CA (W ) and obtain the Bob's W . Then J performs a validation on the correctness of E pkB * (W ) sent by Alice, by computing the encryption of W from the WCA with the buyer's public key pk B * . If E pkB * (W ) is not the same as E pkB * (W ), then E pkB * (W ) turns out to be incorrect, J rejects the case. It is obvious that the verification won't work using probabilistic cryptosystems. As explained in Sec. 1, the buyer-seller watermarking protocol requires watermarking insertion to be performed in the encrypted domain, and it should be achieved by employing privacy homomorphic cryptosystems. However, all efficient privacy homomorphic cryptosystems are probabilistic [9] . As a result, the protocol fails to function properly as claimed.
Failure for unlinkability
In the protocol, Bob first obtains an anonymous certificate Cert CA (pk B ) from the CA, i.e., a digital certificate without the real identity of the applicant, in order to provide the buyer's anonymity. As Lei et al. claimed, by issuing the anonymous certificate to Bob, the CA is responsible for binding this anonymous certificate to Bob's identity. In each transaction with Alice, Bob generates an one-time key pair (pk B * , sk B * ), and creates a certificate of pk B * on the honor of the certified public key pk B . Unfortunately, the protocol fails to provide transaction unlinkability: during all transactions from the seller to the buyer, the public key anonymous certificate Cert CA (pk B ) stays the same, unless the buyer contacts the CA before each transaction to acquire a new certificate, which is impractical for real-life applications.
3 Attacks on the protocol of Ibrahim et al.
The players involved in Ibrahim et al.'s protocol [12] are the seller A, the buyer B, the certificate authority CA, and the arbitrator J. The protocol comprises two phases, namely the watermark generation and insertion protocol, and the identification and arbitration protocol.
Attack on the seller's security
In the protocol, Bob generates his secret watermark W , and W is approved by the CA. The watermarked content is X = X ⊕ V ⊕ W , V is Alice's watermark. Since Bob knows W , it is possible for Bob to remove his watermark W from the watermarked content X . Hence, the protocol fails to provide non-repudiation and traitor traceability.
Ibrahim et al. assume that it is impossible for Bob to remove W from X , because Bob doesn't have access of the original content X or the watermark embedding algorithm. Unfortunately, the assumption is unrealistic, and it can be combated by employing a blind watermarking scheme [16, 8] , where the original content is not required to remove the watermark. On the other hand, there is no technical enforcement to ensure that B can't get the knowledge of the watermarking algorithm employed in the protocol. In fact, according to Kerckhoffs' principle in cryptography, "a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge." "The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy without causing trouble." [15] Therefore, the attack is effective and non-repudiation fails. The protocol fails to provide both the basic requirement of traitor traceability and the seller's security.
Failure for probabilistic cryptosystems
In the watermark generation and insertion protocol, after Alice receives the encrypted value E SKCA (E pkB (W )) from CA, Alice decrypts E SKCA (E pkB (W ) using CA's public key pk CA , and then computes the message digest of the result E pkB (W ), i.e. H (E pkB (W )). Next, Alice computes the message digest of E pkB (W ) sent earlier by Bob, i.e. H(E pkB (W )). Alice compares the values of H (E pkB (W )) and H(E pkB (W )). If they are equal the protocol continues, else the protocol throws exception and terminates. The protocol will fail with probabilistic cryptosystems, because in that case, E pkB (W ) computed by the CA and E pkB (W ) provided by Bob would likely be different values. Then Alice would consider the protocol failed, and halt the protocol. Following the same reasoning of the similar attack on the Lei et al.'s protocol in Sec. 2.3, we can prove that the protocol fails to employ privacy homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems.
Failure for anonymity and unlinkability
The protocol doesn't specify the registration subprotocol. In each transaction with Alice, Bob provides Alice his PKI certificate Cert CA (B) issued by a trustworthy CA. Since Cert CA (B) is not an anonymous certificate, Alice can identify Bob. Therefore, Bob's anonymity is not preserved whatsoever. It is clear that the protocol fails to provide anonymity and unlinkability for the buyer.
Proposed protocol
The proposed buyer-seller watermarking protocol involves four players: the seller Alice, the buyer Bob, the trustworthy CA that functions as a group manager, and an arbitrator. The protocol consists of three phases. First, Bob registers at the CA before the purchase in the registration protocol. Second, Bob only needs to contact Alice during transactions in the watermark generation and insertion protocol. Third, in case Alice found a pirated copy, the identification and arbitration protocol enables her to identify the copyright violator, with the help of the judge and the CA.
The following assumptions should hold in the protocol, otherwise, the security properties cannot be guaranteed. We assume a public key infrastructure PKI is well deployed, such that each entity has a PKI certificate issued by the CA. The CA is assumed to be trustworthy, because the PKI should be secure. For consistency, we assume that the digital content is a still image, although the protocol can be applied to other multimedia formats such as audio or video. Note that the security of the protocol depends on the security of the underlying watermarking and cryptographic building blocks. Hence, the watermarking scheme employed should be collusion resistant. In particular, nobody is able to detect and delete the embedded watermark from a content without knowing the watermark. Our scheme employs the privacy homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem [20] and Cox et al.'s robust collusion resistant watermarking scheme [5] . Camenisch et al.'s verifiable encryption scheme [4] is employed for the key escrow of the buyer's private key at the CA, such that the buyer can prove to the seller that the plaintext is valid without revealing the secrecy. We choose to employ the dynamic group signature proposed by Bellare et al. [1] as an example.
Registration protocol
The registration protocol, performed between the buyer Bob and the CA, is depicted in Fig. 1 .
In the group key generation phase, the CA generates a tuple (gpk, gmsk). The group public key gpk consists of a public encryption key pk e , a certificate verification key pk s , and some security parameters. The manager secret key gmsk is the decryption key sk e corresponding to pk e . The certificate creation key sk s , corresponding to pk s , is denied to the group manager. It is to prevent from issuing certificates for keys it generates itself, for traceability.
To join the group, Bob generates a public and private key pair (upk B , usk B ), and a signing and verification key pair (pk B , sk B ). Bob sends to the CA his signature sig B on pk B with the key usk B . After the signature is verified, the CA issues the group membership to Bob by issuing a certificate of pk B and Bob's identity B. Then the CA stores Bob's public key and Bob's signature (pk B , sig B ) in the registration table. Bob receives the certificate Cert B and derives his group signature key gsk B from the tuple (B, pk B , sk B , cert B ).
Watermark generation and embedding protocol
The watermark generation and insertion protocol, as depicted in Fig. 2 , can be executed multiple times for multiple transactions between the seller Alice and the buyer Bob. In order to uniquely bind a particular transaction to the item of interest X, Alice and Bob first negotiate a purchase agreement ARG on transaction specifications.
Bob generates a one-time anonymous public and private key pair (pk * B , sk * B ), and signs the public key pk * B with his group signature key gsk B . For key escrow, Bob encrypts the secret key sk * B with the CA's encryption key pk CA , and computes a verifiable proof pf sk * B for the escrow cipher e esc , in order to assure Alice that the encrypted message is valid without compromising sk * B . For each transaction, Bob generates a unique watermark W B , in compliance with the features of the content X for robustness, and transfers the encrypted watermark and all the other public information m to Alice.
Alice verifies Bob's signature and verifiable proof, as well as Bob's group signature on his anonymous public key. Similarly, Alice generates two unique watermarks V and W A for each transaction. The first round of watermark insertion is performed as: X = X ⊕ V . Note that the sole purpose of V , is to be used as a key to search the sales record in case Alice finds a pirated copy of her products [19, 17] . Alice computes the composite watermark W in the encrypted domain by employing privacy homomorphism:
Alice performs the second round of watermark insertion:
Where ⊕ denotes the watermark insertion operation in the message space, and ⊗ denotes the corresponding operation in the encrypted domain. Note that the computation is possible because we assume the encryption E pk * B (·) is privacy homomorphic with respect to ⊕. Alice stores V, W A and Bob's information in T able A , and delivers the encrypted content X to Bob. After decryption
obtains the watermarked content X from Alice.
Identification and arbitration protocol
The identification and arbitration protocol is executed among the seller Alice, an judge J , and the CA, as depicted
Cert B -gsk B ← (B, pk B , sk B , Cert B ) Figure 1 . The registration protocol performed between the buyer B and the CA 
Note: µ = GSig(gsk B , pk * B ) Figure 3 . The copyright violator identification and arbitration protocol performed among the seller A, the judge J , and the CA.
in Fig. 3 . In case Alice finds a pirated copy Y of X, she extracts the watermark U from Y , and searches the sales record by correlating U with every V in T able A . Then she provides all relevant information together with the intermediate watermarked content X to J . If the signature provided by Alice is verified, J accepts the case and forwards the seller's key escrow cipher to the CA to recover the private key of the buyer. The CA decrypts the cipher, recovers the key, and returns the encrypted value E pkJ (sk * B ) to J . After J obtains the buyer's key by decryption sk * B = D skJ (E pkJ (sk * B )), he further obtains the buyer's secret watermark W = D sk * B (ew). Then J compares the extracted watermark from X and Y provided by Alice, with the one that is derived from the recovered watermarks (W B , W A ) from the buyer and the seller. If they match with a high correlation, the suspected buyer is proven to be guilty. Otherwise, the buyer is innocent. Note that until now, the buyer's identity is unexposed.
To recover the buyer's identity, J orders the CA to open the buyer's group signature, with the group manager's secret key gmsk. Upon receiving the recovered identity B and a claim proof τ , J verifies the CA's claim. If verified, the judge closes the case and announces that the buyer with identity B is guilty.
Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the security properties of the proposed scheme. The soundness and completeness of the protocol rely on the security and robustness of the underlying cryptographic and watermarking primitives. Non-framing (buyer's security). Alice doesn't know the watermarked content delivered to Bob X , neither does she know Bob's secret watermark W B . Therefore, Alice cannot accuse Bob by distributing replicas of X herself. On the other hand, Bob is able to generate his watermark and there is no third party involved in the watermark generation phase. Therefore, Alice cannot recover Bob's watermark via conspiracy attacks. Further, Alice can't forge Bob's signature that explicitly binds E pk * B (W B ), pk * B to ARG, which in turn binds to a particular transaction of X. In this regard, it is infeasible for Alice to transplant Bob's watermark to another content to fabricate piracy. Non repudiation (seller's security). Bob only knows his watermark W B , but not the composite watermark W generated from the watermarks of Alice and Bob. On the other hand, there is no third party involved in the protocol, so Bob cannot obtain any secret information via conspiracy attacks. Therefore, it is infeasible for Bob to remove his watermark W B from the watermarked content X , neither can he claim that the copy was created by Alice or a security breach of Alice's system. Because only Bob knows sk B * and W B , no one can forge Bob's copy.
Traceability. The protocol provides a mechanism that, once a pirated copy is found, Alice can provide the judge with sufficient information related to the particular transaction. The judge is able to identify the the privacy violator with the help of the CA, due to the traceability property of the underlying group signature scheme. Dispute resolution. When a dispute occurs, even without Bob providing his secret key sk * B or watermark, the judge can recover sk * B from the CA, then recover W B , and he can further arbitrate if Bob is guilty or not. Revocable anonymity. Before the purchase, Bob requests a group signature key gsk B from the trustworthy CA, which in turn takes responsibility to bind Bob's signature key to Bob's identity. In each transaction with Alice, Bob generates an one-time anonymous key pair, and provides Alice a group signature of the one-time public key (pk * B with gsk B . Bob's anonymity is preserved due to the anonymity property of the underlying group signature scheme [1] . Note that the CA is trustworthy, otherwise the group signature wouldn't be secure. Bob's anonymity is not revoked by the CA only until he is adjudicated to be guilty. Unlinkability. Unlinkability is achieved due to the unlinkability property introduced by the underlying group signature and Bob's one-time key pair (pk * B , sk * B ). Given the list of sales information, no one can relate two transactions together as if they were from the same buyer. Mutual authentication. Man-in-the-middle attacks on the protocol are infeasible. First, PKI is well deployed to ensure mutual authentication between entities, as the basic requirement of a secure protocol. Second, all messages are transferred in a secure communication channel, such that eavesdropping is infeasible.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present attacks on two buyer-seller watermarking protocols proposed by Lei et al. [17] and Ibrahim et al. [12] , and prove that neither of these protocols is able to provide security for the buyer and/or the seller as claimed. Further, we point out that both protocols are not able to work properly when employing homomorphic probabilistic cryptosystems. We also address the anonymity and unlinkability problem in these protocols. We propose an improved protocol, which is secure and fair for both the seller and the buyer. Our protocol employs privacy homomorphic cryptosystems and group signature schemes, in order to protect the secrecy of the buyer and the seller, and to preserve revocable anonymity of the buyer. Comparing with early work, our scheme is able to provide all the required security properties of a secure and anonymous buyer-seller watermarking protocol, namely non-framing, non-repudiation, traceability, mutual authentication, dispute resolution, anonymity and unlinkability.
